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Methods are proposed for measuring the combat effectiveness of
the main armament of tank and antitank weapons using firepower
potential scores. A comparison of these scores can be used as a
simplified screening process to decrease the number of candidate
options that must be evaluated by simulation or detailed analysis.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
Measuring combat effectiveness is one of the most difficult
problems encountered in any military analysis . The purpose of this
paper is to enrich the methodology of measuring and evaluating combat
effectiveness by using firepower potential scores to quantify the more
important parameters of weapon systems. These potential scores can
then be used to compare or rank the effectiveness of weapons or units.
There are three general problem areas where operations research
and system analysis techniques are directly related to measuring and
quantifying combat effectiveness: Force Planning Analysis, Systems
Design Analysis, and Wargaming. Personnel working in these areas
are frequently confronted with attempting to evaluate numerous options
that can satisfy specific requirements. For example, the Force Planner
is confronted with the problem to determine the size and composition
of a force to meet a given threat. There are almost unlimited possi-
bilities that could be tried and in fact should be tried in an attempt
to obtain a proper mix and size force that meets stated limitations.
For example, TATAWS III, completed by the Armor Agency of the Combat
Developments Command in March 1969, had to evaluate 3420 possible
alternatives that could be obtained by cross -attaching tank and
mechanized infantry forces in an attempt to find the "best" size and
equipment for Armor units against a given threat. [7]

The Systems Designer must evaluate designs to determine which
are feasible and which are the most effective. This is the type
analysis done by the Combat Developments Command in their "K" Tank
Study which compared the design parameters of several candidate
tanks. [12]
Wargaming personnel also use measures of combat effectiveness
to evaluate and determine attrition of forces for different scenarios
,
weapons, and tactics in computer and manual simulations. The
Research Analysis Corporation has devised "Quick Game" and
" THEATERSPIEL" as two simulations that use measures of combat
effectiveness to determine attrition. [5]
In all these cases, it might be possible to evaluate completely
each and every option using computer simulation but usually monetary
and time constraints have limited the analyst's ability to test all
possible options. The procedure then is to limit detailed evaluation
to only those options that appear to be feasible. While some of the
options can be eliminated quickly and easily by using judgement or
visually noticing that a constraint will be violated, the remaining set
of options is many times still too large to handle and thus further
screening is required.
This paper suggests that firepower potentials can be used to
quickly evaluate these remaining options and select for detailed
evaluation and simulation those options that will be the most fruitful.
A methodology of firepower potential exists and is presently in use,
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but as will be pointed out, possesses some shortcomings which may
prevent it from being an accurate screening tool.
Since the USSR and its satellite nations are known to possess
more than 40,000 tanks of many different makes and models, sure and
effective measures must be taken to insure that the U.S. capability
to defeat armor in any area of confrontation is sufficient to meet this
threat. Because of the magnitude of the armor threat, this paper will
deal only with the methodology used to compute the firepower potential
of the main armament on tank and antitank weapons. The factors that
affect the success of a tank in battle will be evaluated to find the
most important quantifiable parameters that can be used to define
potential. And finally, these factors will be combined in a manner
that is mathematically correct and heuristically appealing to obtain
models that can be used to quickly and efficiently limit all possible
options to those that are both feasible and effective.

II. WHAT IS POTENTIAL ?
Webster's dictionary defines "potential" as existing in possibility
and capable of development into actuality. To apply this definition to
the capabilities of a tank in combat would not provide a sufficient
description of what a tank adds to the combat situation. What is
needed is a more specific definition which can be quantified in some
manner so that it can be measured or ranked in comparisons. The
influence that a tank or a tank unit has on the combat situation depends
on many factors, but if potential is defined as the worth, value, gain,
or return it can be quantified and used to signify the effectiveness of
the tank. For the purposes of this paper potential will be synonymous
with worth and will be expressed as a firepower score. Clearly the
term "worth" is not sufficient to cover all situations in combat because
a tank by itself may have very little or possibly no worth. The worth
depends upon having a target for the tank to shoot at, ammunition to
fire, personnel to operate the tank and many other factors. These
factors imply that the potential of a tank depends on the situation in
which it is employed. It can therefore be concluded that the definition
of potential as worth, must be supplemented with other terms to
describe the situation to be evaluated.
The technique of operationally defining a term is ideally suited
for potential because an operational definition completely specifies
the situation and describes how potential should be measured. Since
8

this paper is advocating the use of firepower potential as a screening
measure it is desirable to standardize the manner in which the potential
is measured. Before and during the battle, evaluations cannot in
general produce a quantative computation of worth because of the
uncertainty involved. Evaluation of "after battle" statistics can pro-
duce a true quantitative measure of a tank's success such as "our
tank is twice as good as theirs because each of our tanks killed two
of theirs." This paper therefore will use the firepower score to
represent the worth of a tank before and during a battle. The score
will in no way represent the quantitative worth but can be used to
obtain relative rankings of the worth of future participants in a con-
flict .
Potential can now be operationally defined as the ability of a
tank to attrit the weapon systems of an opposing force and the gain to
the friendly force from the attrition. This ability will be measured by
the firepower score.
The problem now is to find the factors that affect a tank's
success in battle and then determine how to measure these factors in
order to compute a firepower score that will represent the effectiveness
of a tank. The list of possible factors is extensive but the most sig-
nificant are firepower, mobility, survivability, maintainability,
sustainability, enemy capability, and interaction with other friendly
weapons.

III. SELECTION OF FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE POTENTIAL
While the seven factors just described are very general and
interrelated, each has several basic components which can influence
the outcome of a battle. A selection from these areas must be made
to determine which specific component contributes to a tank's poten-
tial and also state the parameters on which it depends.
A. FIREPOWER
Since this paper is only concerned with the main armament of
a tank, the components in this factor are the gun, the ammunition and
the necessary fire control equipment to aim and fire. In general all
weapons are designed so that they have specific hitting and killing
ability for each type round against various targets. When these uesign
parameters are combined with operational data [acquisition time, identi-
fication of target, time to load weapon, and various errors in aiming
and trajectory] a value representing the probability of obtaining a
mobility or firepower kill (M or F kill) on a specific target with a
single round is obtained. This single shot kill probability (Pssk) is
the first factor to be used in the models to compute the weapon's
potential. Pssk is dependent on the range to the target, weapon, type
of target and type of ammunition fired.
The second factor to be used in potential computations is the
quantity of ammunition available by type. This input data can be
10

based on historical usage rates, basic load carrying capabilities or
some other resupply rate. The quantity of ammunition used is de-
pendent upon the posture of the weapon and the duration of the battle.
Other factors in the firepower area that were considered but not
selected for inclusion in potential were: parallax resolution problems,
super-elevation correction factors, tube wear, difference in ammunition
propellants and speed of flight. These factors could adversely affect
the worth but are considered to be insignificant or have already been




Tanks are designed for general mobility across country. The
design parameters are based on terrain, trafficability of the soil,
obstacles both man-made and natural, and weather. All these factors
are in turn interrelated and in addition, the enemy posture, strength
and capability can influence mobility. [The mobility considered here
is tactical mobility not strategic mobility.] All of these factors can be
quantified into a variable called rate of movement. This rate is the
relative rate of movement, relative in that it depends upon both the
friendly and the enemy rate
.
C. ENEMY CAPABILITIES
The enemy's capability to defend himself using armor protection
has already been included in the Pssk factor. What remains is to
account for the enemy's offensive capability; the enemy Pssk against
11

the friendly weapon systems. To account for this capability a factor
called utility will represent the gain received by the friendly force for
killing an enemy target and destroying its offensive capability. Utility
will be the product of the enemy ammunition and the Pssk of the enemy
weapon against the friendly force. It is clearly range dependent in an
inverse manner. That is, a friendly force gets more utility for killing
an enemy weapon system earlier in the battle because the friendly force
is not subjected to the enemy weapons' kill rate for the remainder of
the battle. This utility is therefore dependent on the quantity of enemy
ammunition, the Pssk of the enemy weapon against the friendly force
and the range separating the two forces
.
D. MAINTAINABILITY
Maintainability is the ability of the tank to remain in working
order and hence available to fight when called to do so. The factors
in this area are: reliability of the gun, engines, tracks, communication
and fire control equipment. Since potential is worth, this paper assumes
that maintainability factors of a well designed tank can be disregarded.
This means that the tank is always available for combat with probability
one. While this may be somewhat unrealistic, the only other alternative
would be to assign a worth of zero to any tank which is inoperative.





Sustainability is the ability of the tank to remain in the combat
area. The factors involved are all the classes of supply: POL so the
tank can move, ammunition so it can shoot and food so the crewmen
can eat. Since ammunition and mobility have already been accounted
for, other factors in this area can be disregarded by assuming that




Survivability reflects the ability of a tank to survive combat on
the battlefield. Most of this area can be considered to interact with
other areas already covered such as mobility and enemy capabilities.
These other areas sufficiently cover survivability so no factor from
this area is selected for inclusion in firepower computation.
G. INTERACTION WITH OTHER WEAPONS
This area includes the general need for close in support provided
by Infantry-type forces and the interaction between individual tanks in
the same unit as well as interaction with the fires of other supporting
weapons. This area is generally unexplored as far as quantifying how
much more effective a platoon of five tanks is than just five individual
independently operated tanks.
This paper assumes that the interaction capability is not degraded
by assuming independent operation. While this assumption leads to
13

less potential for a given organic unit it can be justified by the fact
that enemy potential will be computed under the same assumption. The
assumption results in a great deal of needed simplification. Consider
a U. S. antitank force consisting of two teams of two guns per team.
Since U.S. doctrine recommends that AT weapons be employed in
pairs, this assumption can handle a case where one AT gun is knocked
out and the "mate" joins with the full team to become a force with
three AT guns .
By the above selection process the potential of a weapon or unit
can be represented by combining and measuring the following factors:
1. Pssk - which represents the ability of the weapon system to shoot
or launch a projectile the required distance to a target and once
there get a mobility or firepower kill.
2 . Quantity of ammunition - which represents the ability of the
weapons system to bring a certain amount of fire on the enemy.
3 . Rate of movement - which represents the relative rate of move-
ment of the two forces.
4
. Utility - which represents the gain received by killing an enemy
target early in the battle
.
These factors all depend upon the distance between the two




IV. MODELS TO COMPUTE POTENTIAL
A. GENERAL
Weapon Firepower Potential can be computed by using two dif-
ferent methodologies: static or dynamic . In general, the static
potential methodology considers the potential available at a specific
moment in time, without regard to any past or future data or worth.
This approach is typified by its ease of computation and generalization
of the combat situation. Dynamic methods are generally more compli-
cated and are based on considerations from higher mathematics but
account for past potential and consider the interaction of the forces
over a period of time.
While both dynamic and static computations could be made for
any given scenario, the methodology used depends upon the resolution
that is required. A high resolution requirement means that the analyst
is interested in the detailed effect of each weapon system on the out-
come. Usually only a small number of weapons are involved which
insures that a valid movement rate for each weapon can be obtained.
Requirements for low resolution results are used in cases where large
forces are involved and the effect of varying the size of the forces is
required. The static methodology should be used in most of these cases
because of the difficulty in quantifying movement rates and the effect
of interaction between units .
15

A unit tank-antitank potential is computed by summing the fire-
power potentials of the weapons organic to the unit. If the dynamic
potentials are summed, then the result is a dynamic unit potential.
Likewise, the static weapon potentials yield static unit potentials.
B. PRESENT FIREPOWER POTENTIAL
The Combat Operations Research Group (CORG) in the mid 1960's
developed a Firepower Potential computation that is still in use. [11]
This model to compute tank and antitank weapon potential is
FP=AP,. n W ;kill
where A is the ammo available based on historical data for eleven
different combat postures of friendly and enemy forces; P,
.,, is the
kill
average probability of killing an enemy main battle tank at an opening
range of 1500 meters; and W is a range factor based on how far the
friendly weapon can fire.
This model is "good" for situations where extremely low resolu-
tion is required but has the following shortcomings that may detract
from its effectiveness as a screening tool for evaluation of tank designs
or tank and antitank combat situations.
1. P, ... is not range dependent and cannot be easily adjusted to




is based on the ability of a system to kill an enemy main
battle tank. This factor cannot be changed to portray the difference
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in capability due to targets other than main battle tanks which may be
present on the battlefield.
3. "W" the range factor is a simple weighting device that gives
added weight to weapons that have longer maximum ranges. This
factor is a substitute for a term which quantifies the utility gained by




One assumption of the present CORG model is that historically
tank battles occur at ranges less than 1500 meters. This fact does
not reflect the capabilities of present weapons in combat and questions
why the United States is still designing weapons systems with a maximum
effective range in excess of 1500 meters. In fact, if this assumption
is relaxed and the range to the target is included as a parameter, a
more discerning measure results.
Weiss' [13] concept of force separation will be used as the
measure of the range to the target. Force separation is defined as the
distance between the centers of mass of the opposing forces. Since
force separation is a relative measure, it is independent of the
postures of the two forces but can account for increases or decreases
in range produced by different tactical movements. The force sepa-ation
at the start of the battle can be designated as the opening ran;, i (Ro)
and the separation at the end of battle as the final range (Rf) . Depending
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on the tactical movements as specified by the scenario Rf is the
maximum or the minimum range of the weapon.




J Pssk (r) dr
Ro - Rf Rf
Pssk (r) is the single shot kill probability as a function of range. If
the scenario to be screened using firepower potential scores provides
information on terrain, a valid opening range can be computed by a
terrain analysis to determine an average intervisibility distance. For
example, if the scenario included tank forces operating in the Sinai
desert an opening range of 3000 meters would be feasible. For tank
operations in Viet Nam, Ro could be less than 1000 meters; the Rhine
Valley, Germany, would have a different Ro factor. As long as a valid
average opening range can be obtained, this model will yield good
results. For larger theaters such as Europe where an average Ro would
be difficult to obtain or invalid, this model may not be acceptable.
D. EXTENSION II
Since heavy tanks are generally harder to kill than main battle
tanks, it is readily apparent that the value of Pssk vs an enemy main
battle tank is overrating a weapon's capability if an enemy heavy tank
is encountered. Extension I can be modified to account for the different
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killing ability of a weapon system facing targets other than main battle
tanks. By estimating the percentage of each type target that will be
encountered on the battlefield, a weighted average for a systems Pssk
can be included in the model.
Ro




where n = number of different type targets
i = type target
Pi = percentage of targets of type i and
Pssk (r) = probability of killing a target of type i as a function
of range.
Pssk of all United States weapons vs any weapon in the enemy
inventory is available and can be obtained. The parameter Pi :. sit-
uation dependent and requires additional specific scenario information.
In a force planning scenario Pi can easily be obtained from the threat
analysis and enemy troop lists. In most situations the threat analysis
will provide the force and equipment that makes up the threat. As an
example, if the threat analysis in Southeast Asia rules out any employment
of enemy main battle tanks this model will account for that fact.
Similarly the Sinai Desert threat may show a predominance of heavy
tanks. It is well known that threat analysis involving satellite nations
of Russia do not include the employment of new main battle tanks.
These satellite nations are assumed to have a predominance of older
19

more easily killed tanks . [4] All these factors serve to point out that
the Pi value could be validly obtained and in fact, for low resolution
applications, the value of Pi could be based upon the known ratio of
equipment in a whole theater of operations . The CORG model could
seriously over or underrate the potential in these specific situations.
E. EXTENSION III
Up to now the historical ammunition expenditure factor has not
been modified in any of the models . While historical data may not be
extremely accurate it is realistic for U.S. forces and its allies. The
problem is to obtain realistic data for all possible adversaries. In
past conflicts the USSR has always reported expending large amounts
of tank ammunition. This may have occurred because their tanks lacked
the accuracy or because their supply lines were so short that they did
not have to constrain their expenditure rates. In the case of some
possible adversaries these expenditure rates can only be estimated.
Since the ammunition factor used to compute potential is so important,
accurate expenditure rates are a necessity.
This paper proposes an alternate to using expenditure rates; that
is to use the basic load carrying capability of the weapon system.
Potential is, in effect, evaluating a battle of short duration. This
implies that in most cases ammunition would not be resupplied but will
be expended according to the amount that can be carried with the weapon
systems. Using basic load expenditure rates seems heuristically
20

correct. Because of the nature of the tank and its configutation the
rated basic load cannot safely be exceeded and resupply is a long and
tedious process by which the ammunition must be loaded one round at
a time through a hatch on the turret. If resupply is attempted it must
take place outside the combat area and essentially the tank is out of
service. By substituting A for basic load of ammunition into Extension
II, Extension III is:
Ro
n
rh W I Pi J Pssk.(r)dr.
Ro - Rf i=l
This substitution could also be made into the CORG model for situations
where expenditure rates are not known or cannot be accurately estimated
F . EXTENSION IV
In Extension I the CORG model was made range dependent but the
CORG range factor "W" was left in the model as a representation of
the worth of killing a target. This factor initially seems to be double
weighting the weapon's ability to kill at long ranges. In actuality the
range factor expresses the desire of commanders to kill targets as far
away as possible. To alleviate any possible double counting it is
proposed that the worth of killing a target be directly included in the
computation as utility. The utility gained by killing a target depends
upon the target killed. For example, more is gained by killing a heavy
tank than by killing an antitank gun.
21

Utility can be evaluated by ranking the enemy weapons according
to their destructive ability against the friendly force and then assign a
number to each ranking. If Wi is the ranking of the utility gained by




A £ Pi Wi / Pssk.(r)dr.
Ro'-Rf i=l 1
Rf
Utility can also be considered as proportional to the enemy's
kill rate against friendly systems . This kill rate is range dependent
and is the product of the enemy ammunition expenditure rate times the
single shot kill probability of the enemy weapon against the friendly
weapon. If wi (r) represents the range dependent kill rate of target i








The concept that utility is proportional to kill rate is widely used in
Lanchester-type equations and has been explored by Taylor [9].
While this model seems appealing because it contains all the
elements of potential that are important, it does fail to evaluate a
situation in which each force has only one type weapon. In this case
the model, because of the definition of utility, is symmetric and the
potential for each side will be dependent only upon the numbers of
weapons on each side. This of course is not a true evaluation and




In all of the preceding extensions the static firepower potential
methodology has been used to construct the models. Extension IV(b)
provides an average kill potential over the range that separates the
two forces; but when one or both forces is moving, this average kill
potential changes at the rate that the separation between the two forces
is increasing or decreasing. The dynamic potential methodology is
needed to account for this change in potential during the future course
of the battle. A value for the velocity of the range separation included
in the computations, will make it possible to determine for how long a
period of time a given kill rate is in effect and what is the utility of
the targets killed during that time period.
At the same time that velocity is included, it is also possible
to revise the utility of killing a target to account for the "multiplying
effect" attributed to the dynamics of combat. This "multiplying effect"
accounts for the fact that a weapon lost early in the battle decreases
the potential for the loss at that time and in addition decreases the
potential because the killing capability for the rest of the battle has
also been lost. If an assumption is made that the utility gained from
a target killed at R min (minimum range) is the actual kill rate of the
target against the friendly force at that range, then it is possible to
integrate backwards from the minimum range and find the utility gained
by killing the target on the first firing at the opening range (Ro)
.
Taylor [8] has accomplished this mathematically for kill rates that vary
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Wi(r) is the utility gained by killing a target of type i as a function of
velocity of the force separation and can be obtained from a backward
integration in the manner described by Taylor [10] . The actual velocity
of the force separation depends on many parameters and would require
additional study effort to validate. If a constant velocity is assumed,
this model may be used to compute potential after it has been modified
to be a function of time rather than range. In reality the rate of move-
ment is not constant. It clearly depends upon the amount and accuracy
of fire the attacking force is receiving and on the posture of the de-
fending or delaying force. In addition, as the force separation decreases,
the acquisition of targets becomes easier and the tank must stop in
firing positions more frequently thus slowing the rate of force separation.
When a range is reached where a final assault is possible the tank
would speed up in order to close with and destroy the enemy.
The dynamic model has the added property that it is not symmetric.
That is, any two weapon systems will have a different potential unless
they have exactly the same characteristics . This model could be further
evaluated to determine the change in potential that would result from
changes in velocity of the force separation.
24

V. EVALUATION OF THE MODELS
A. SCENARIO
To evaluate the models of Chapter IV, a scenario that required
high resolution was written. The hypothetical terrain situation included
a velocity of the change of force separation and a maximum opening
range of 3000 meters. Each force had a fixed quantity and mix of tank
and antitank weapons and each weapon had a hypothetical set of the
following specified characteristics:
1 . range dependent single shot probability of killing each
type target;
2. historical ammunition expenditure rates;
3. basic load carrying capability;
4. maximum effective range.
The complete scenario is attached as Appendix A.
Each of the static models was tested in the scenario so that
the results could be compared. The dynamic model was, for ease of
computation, tested by using only one type weapon of each force.
Computations were also made using different opening ranges to check
the sensitivity of each model.
B. COMPUTATION RESULTS
All of the models yielded results which were consistent with the
logic used to construct the model. In all cases the Red force had
higher potential than the Blue force which essentially means that trie
25

Blue force probably could not win the confrontation because they were
"outgunned." The most notable difference in potential occurred in the
computations for Extension III, where the different ammunition rates
were used. This was as expected and again serves to point out the
criticality of a valid ammunition expenditure rate when using any fire-
power potential model.
When the computations were compared by determining the per-
centage of unit potential contributed by the weapons of a certain type,
it was found that the present CORG system continually overrated the
weapons that had a maximum effective range of less than the opening
range. As the opening range was decreased the results indicated that
the percentage of potential contributed by these weapons increased.
Heuristically this seems correc: because these weapons are involved
in the battle earlier and the potentials of the longer range weapons
have decreased because the differential of their range advantage is not
as great.
A strict mathematical comparison of the different models was not
conducted because of the validation problem (see Section D) . A sample
of the results of the computations can be found in Appendix B.
C. COMPLEXITY
There is a definite order of complexity and ease of computation
associated with these models. Although the sample computations were
made on a desk calculator, all models could be programmed for a digital
26

computer where the compiler time would be proportional to the complexity
of the model. The CORG model is the least complex followed closely
by Extension I which accounts for range dependence. Complexity
increases through Extension II, Extension IV (a) and Extension IV(b) with
the most complex being the dynamic model Extension V. Extension III
is classed with Extension IV(b) and in fact the ammunition factor
employed in Extension III could be applied to any of the models presented
If an extremely high resolution requirement exists then the model
may be so detailed and complex that a point will be reached where the
potential computation exceeds the cost and time required to perform a
simulation of all the options . At such a point weapon firepower potential
scores will not be an effective screening tool.
D. VALIDITY
How effective or efficiently any of these models are at screening
options can only be surmised at this time. For a model to be effective
it must be validated and this was not feasible because of the security
classification of weapon characteristics. The models presented in this
paper could be validated by computing the actual potential of all the
options evaluated in the TATAWS study.
This potential could then be compared with the performance of
the option in the TATAWS computer simulation. At the same time that
validation is taking place the models can be evaluated for their screening
27

ability and some measure of effectiveness can be assigned to each




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
Weapon Firepower Potential is a relatively new area of research;
much is left to be accomplished. While this paper has only dealt with
the main armament of tank and antitank weapons, each weapon in the
inventory of the United States and its possible adversaries has been
evaluated under the CORG potential. Some of these potentials accurately
evaluate their weapons while others are based on rather weak assumptions
and require extended modification.
While many organizations and individuals have attempted poten-
tial evaluations of whole systems, this work has generally fragmented
itself to assessing the individual weapons of the system and continued
to ignore the interaction of a system within itself and between or with
other systems. In these days of advanced technology it seems in-
credulous that it has not been possible to quantify the gain in potential
when two tanks are operating together. Apparently work in this area
has either failed or has not been pursued to a satisfactory conclusion.
Continued validation of the CORG System is sorely needed and
while it would not be a simple project, it is essentially required if
the potential scores are to be used for any critical purpose.
The effect of mobility on the outcome of battles hu. : been studied
extensively by Bonder [2,3] while the Combat Operations Research
Group [11] has attempted to quantify mobility into potential. Both of
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these efforts could possibly be expanded to produce valid measures of
the effect on firepower potentials directly attributed to the dynamics
of combat. All of the topics in this section are recommended as
extremely fruitful problems for future projects or theses in the area
of Weapon Firepower Potential.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The firepower potential of tank weapons systems is a situation
dependent evaluation of the system's capability to perform in future
combat. Once a scenario has been established and the degree of
resolution specified, a model can be selected to determine the potential
of the force. This force potential then can be used as a screening
device to modify weapon systems, composition of force, or quantity of
systems until parity of potential is obtained between the two forces.
All options that achieve parity or near-parity with the opposing
force can then be further evaluated by computer simulation, detailed
analysis, or field test. The screening done by the force potential
scores should considerably reduce the cost and time required to evaluate
designs, war games, or force plans.
Weapon firepower potential is needed to solve the problems
initially presented in this paper. Potential models, once they are
ve.lLdated, can be used to screen many options and allow the analyst
to devote his skill and time to solving the basic problems of how much
force is needed? what should be the composition of the force? and





The following scenario is devised to test models that could
possibly be used to compute weapon and unit firepower potentials.
This scenario lacks some realism in that the organic units do not
possess the same type weapon system. This was done to ascertain
the sensitivity of the models to differentiate between systems with
different characteristics
.
Two forces, Red and Blue, are engaged in a conflict. The
terrain has a maximum line of sight of 3000 meters with the Red and
Blue forces both on high ground. Once a battle starts there is no
problem with intervisibility but because of fog and weather conditions
the opening range (separation) can vary from a minimum of 500 meters
to the maximum range of 3000 meters. Red or Blue may attack with
the opposition being considered as occupying a deliberate defensive
position.
The Red force has the following equipment:
3 - JS-3 type heavy tanks maximum effective range 5000 meters
*10 - T-62 type medium tanks maximum effective range 4 000 meters
4 - T-55 type medium tanks maximum effective range 3000 meters
3 - T-54 type medium tanks maximum effective range 3000 meters
1-115 mm Antitank gun (SP) heavy maximum effective range
2500 meters
2-85 mm Antitank gun medium maximum effective range
1500 meters
2-76 mm Antitank gun light maximum effective range 750 meters
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5 - "SWAT" AT Rocket Launchers maximum effective range
1500 meters
5 - "SAGR" AT Rocket Launchers maximum effective range
500 meters
The Blue force has the following equipment:
5 - MBT-70 Tanks maximum effective range 4500 meters
*17 - M60 A1E2 Tanks maximum effective range 3500 meters
3 - M60 Al Tanks maximum effective range 3500 meters
3 - 106 mm Recoilless rifles maximum effective range 2000 meters
3 - MAW-AT missiles maximum effective range 1000 meters
*Denotes Main Battle Tank for CORG Computation
Each weapon in the scenario had a graph of single shot kill
probability vs range for each type target of the opposing force. Ninety
of these linear Pssk functions were used to represent all possible
weapon-target combinations. In addition, each of the fourteen
different weapons evaluated had a set of basic load and historical
ammunition usage rates for offensive and defensive situations .
All the numbers used in the scenario are artificial but their
relative magnitude has been kept consistent with generally known
capabilities. For example, at a given range there is more probability
that an MBT-70 will kill a T-54 tank than a JS-3 because the T-54 has






When the static models of Chapter IV are applied to the scenario
the following results are obtained:
A. CORG PRESENT SYSTEM
Force Weapon Firepower Potential
of each type weapon
Total contribution
by these weapon types








Total unit potential 463.56
Red




115mm AT gun 57.75 57.75
85mm AT gun 49.50 99.00
76mm AT gun 11.56 23.12
SWAT 6.51 32.55
SAGR 2.38 11.88
Total unit potential 909.02
B. EXTENSION I
Force Weapon Firepower Potential Total contribution by
of each type weapon these weapon types






106RR 3.45 - 10.40
MAW .68 2.00
Total unit potential 420.40
33

Force Weapon Firepower Potential Total contribution
of each type weapon by these weapon types







115mm AT gun 46.20 46.20
85mm AT gun 24.30 48.60
76mm AT gun 2.80 5.60
SWAT 2.60 12.80
SAGR .40 2.00






































by these weapon types





















Force Weapon Firepower Potential













115mm AT gun 240.12
85mm AT gun 130.74




E . EXTENSION IV
Total contribution
by these weapon types


















(a) Rankings of worth
5 Ranks JS-3 9 Red Ranks MBT-70 9
T-62 8 M60A1E2 8
T-55 7 M60A1 7
T-54 6 106RR 5







Force Weapon Firepower Potential Total contribution
of each type weapon by these weapon types














115mm AT gun 102.16 102.16
85mm AT gun 58.23 116.46
76mm AT gun 12.50 25.00
SWAT 7.40 37.00
SAGR 2.77 13.87
Total unit potential 1812.18
(b) Worth as a function of target kill rate
Force Weapon Firepower Potential Total contribution
of each type weapon by these weapon types
































F. PERCENTAGE OF UNIT POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTED BY WEAPON TYPE
MODEL CORG EXT I EXT II EXT III EXT IVa EXT IVb XXX
WEAPON
MBT-70 22.65 21.41 21.45 18.90 21.46 18.03 16.1
M60A1E2 60.86 64.30 63.42 63.06 63.56 66.71 54.8
M60A1 11.88 11.35 11.63 14.55 11.49 11.29 9.7
106RR 3.64 2.48 2.94 2.23 2.75 3.14 9.7
MAW .97 .48 .55 1.23 .74 .83 9.7
JS-3 16.32 18.89 19.19 11.82 19.08 13.72 8.5
T-62 28.71 33.07 33.21 45.72 33.13 31.61 28.5
T-55 18.77 21.10 20.41 20.88 20.11 21.90 11.4
T-54 11.52 11.81 11.61 10.86 11.43 13.16 . 8.5
115mm 6.35 6.06 5.71 1.82 5.64 6.68 2.9
85mm 10.89 6.38 6.50 1.98 6.43 7.63 5.8
76mm 2.54 .73 .99 1.82 1.38 1.71 5.8
SWAT 3.58 1.68 2.11 3.50 2.04 2.69 14.3
SAGR 1.31 .26 .26 1.57 .77 .90 14.3
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